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C. W. BEELER, Respondent, v. AMERICAN TRUST
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Mortgages - Deeds as Mortgages - Appeal-Conilicting Evidence.-Whether the evidence to show that a deed was intended as a mortgage is clear and convincing is a question
for the trial court, whose determination on conflicting evidence
is not reviewable on appeal.
[2a,2b] Id.-Deeds as Mortgages-Evidence-Sufficiency.-In an
action to declare a deed to be a mortgage, a finding for. the
plaintiff grantor was sustained by evidence showing, among
other things, (1) negotiations resulting. in a refinancing scheme
with a deed to the creditor bank and a one-year lease carrying a rental equivalent to interest on the loan; (2) the execution merely to satisfy a title insurance company of an affidavit
certifying the transaction to be a conveyance; (3) the grantor's retention of possession, specifically' referred to in the
insurance policy; (4) the inequality between the value of the
property and the consideration expressed in the conveyance;
and (5) the subsequent exercise by the grantor of the rights
of an owner, including the maki~g of improvements and the
execution, with the consent of the bank, of leases, not subleases.

.~~;1 {, :.'

[1] See 17 Cal.Jur. 757, 758.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mortgages, § 57; [2] Mortgages,
§ 52; [3] Mortgages, § 36; [4] Mortgages, § 35; [5] Mortgages,
§52(2); [6] Mortgages, §51(1); [7] ContractR §07; 18J Appeal
and Error, § 118; [9,11] Tender, § 4; [10] Payment, ~ 47,
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[3] Id.-Deeds as Mortgages-Inadequacy of Price.-Proof that
property is worth $60,000 in exceSs of the $55,000, the recited

consideration in a deed, is a strong circumstance tending to
show that the deed was intended as a mortgage.
[4] Id. _ Deeds as Mortgages - Payment of Interest.-The disparity between the actual rental value of premises and that
fixed in a lease to the grantor deeding property to a bank,
together with proof that the amount was fixed at the equivalent of the interest rate on the consideration recited in the
deed, is a strong circumstance tending to show that the "rent"
is really an interest payment consistent with the character of
the transaction as a loan.
[5] Id.-Deeds as Mortgages - Evidence - Discharge of Debt.Where a creditor retained the evidences of indebtedness, notwithstanding the recordation of a deed from the debtor to
the creditor purportedly in extinguishment of the debt, the
creditor's mtries on its records designed to indicate the payment of the debt are ineffectual to establish, the discharge of
the debt.
(6] Id.-Deeds a.s Mortgages-Evidence-Parol Evidence.-An affidavit, accompanying a deed, declaring the transaction to be
an absolute conveyance, and not a mortgage or security, is not
conclusive, and does not preclude parol evidence to show the
character of the transaction. (Disapproving in part PeopZe ell:
,.et Fo,.d v. 1,.witt, 18 Cal. 117.)
['1] Oontracts_Oonsideration-promise for Promise.-An agreement by a mortgagee to reduce an indebtedness is supported
by a consideration where it is one of the reciprocal agreements culminating in the execution of a deed by the debtor
to the mortgagee.
[8] Appeal- Presenting Objections - Defenses.-Where lack of
consideration for an agreement w'as not pleaded in the trial
court and the case was tried on other issues, the objection
may not properly be raised for the first time on appeal.
[9] Tender-EfIect.-While a mortgagee is entitled to reimbursement for payment of an installment of taxes which the mortgagor is to pay, the running of interest on the amount paid
is stopped by the mortgagor's offer of payment made in good
faith and with ability to perform. (See Civ. Code, § 1485.)
[3] Value as factor in determining whether deed is mortgage,
note, 90 A.L.R. 953. See, als,o, 17 Oa1.Jur. 788j 36 Am.Jur. 765.
[41 See 17 Oa1.Jur~ 786.
[61 Parol evidence to show deed to be a mortgage, note, 111
A.L.R.4-lS. See, also, 17 Oal.Jur. 776, 36 Am.Jur. 760,
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[10] Payment--Proof-Sufficiency.-In ~ri'· 'aetiori'
aeclafe1il,{:.
deed to be a mortgage, a 'finding that arlobligationto reful~
burse the mortgagee for an installment of taxes :paidwalf dis- '
charged by an assignment by the mortgagor of, a JeaAe, "was "
supported and was binding upon the" reviewing court where'
there was testimony as to the agreement, to make, the assignment in payment of the hiterest and taxes, and, the giVing,
on acceptance of the assignment, of a receipt for
payments
owed.
' , , , . " ' j .,"

all

[11] Tender-EfIect.-Where a trial court properly find~'ttP'Q~ 'sut~:
, flcient evidence that an officer of iI. creditor bank'refused to
negotiate with the debtor without making 'objecfion' 'to ,tli~'
form of the tender or ability to perform 'the offet'made,'tlie '
eourt may properly conclude that further action by the' debto1would meet with like rebuff. by the bank, ,and )that'rtheiiindebtedness ceased to bear interest from that tUne.~, (See',Ci.,.
Code, §§ 1496,1501,1504.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the' Superior.;,Cqp.rt"of {~,~.
hama County. Herbert S. Gans, Judge., Modified and,~firmed.'
'

"':<','''' ,:
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, Action to have a deed declared a mortgage. Judgplentfor
plaintiff modified and affirmed.
'
'
, ,,
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Carr & Kennedy and M. B.
Plant for Appellant.
'
Morrison, Hohfeld, Foerster, Shuman & Clark and Landels
& Weigel, as Amici Curiae, on behalf of Appellant.
Carter, Barrett & Carlton, Daniel S.· Carlton, OliverJ.
Carter, McGregor & McGregor, Major'McGregor and Dudley
G. McGregor for R e s p o n d e n t . '
,.'1
, • ~,

'\: 'I

CURTIS, J.-A rehearing was granted herein topertriit
additional study of the points involved. The further. consideration consequently given this case has only 'ser'vedtb
confirm the conclusions heretofore reached, and accordingly,
the following opinion expresses our sustained views.' :"" ~':~'r
The defendant, American Trust Company;appeais from>an
adverse judgment holding that a deed absolute 'in, fotin"was'
in fact an equitable mortgage. 'The prin<iipalc()nteri.tionpre~
sented by the defendant bank as, a basis for a reversaL of ,the

'\t,'~
i,~li
!
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judgment is the familiar claim that the evidence is insufficient
to justify the conclusion of the trial court. As a related consideration, it is particularly urged that a verified affidavit
of the grantor declaring the contemporaneously executed deed
to be an absolute conveyance of the property, and not intended as a mortgage, is a conclusive expression of the understanding between the parties and precludes the admissibility
of parol evidence to the contrary.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction
out of which this controversy arose appear to be substantially
as follows: Prior to July 28, 1937, Henry Weiss owned a
large tract of land in Tehama County subject to a deed of
trust dated March 21, 1933, running in favor of the American Trust Company to secure two promissory notes for the
aggregate sum of $74,400 and bearing interest at the rate
of 5% per cent per annum. Weiss was unable to make the
stipulated payments and on October 5, 1936, he was served
with a notice of default announcing the bank's election to
proceed with the sale of this ranch property. At the request
of Weiss the foreclosure proceedings were delayed to give him
an opportunity to try to fine.. a purchaser. In June, 1937,
Weiss introduced C. W. Beeler to the officers of the bank
interested in this matter, and the parties thereupon discussed
various propositions looking toward a discount of the debt
and its reduction to a satisfactory figure incident to Beeler's
purchase of the property. Finally, Mr. Hammond, an assistant vice-president of the bank, agreed to accept $55,000 in
cash if that sum were paid within the next few weeks. OIl
July 28, 1937, Weiss conveyed the ranch to Beeler, and it
was expressly provided in the terms of the transfer that
Beeler assumed and agreed to pay the indebtedness secured
by the deed of trust. At the same time Weiss exeeuted and
delivered to Beeler a bill of sale of certain personal property
on the ranch.
The financial arrangement contemplated by Beeler as the
basis for his negotiations with the bank for the early discharge
of the debt on the property at the discounted figure did not
materialize, and as of September 1, 1937, no part of the
$55,000 had been paid. Accordingly, on the last-mentioned
date the bank served upon both Beeler and Weiss a second
notice of default. The indebtedness on its original scale had
then increased to the aggregate sum of $81,000.
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Subsequent to said notice and on September 22, 1937,
Beeler visited the bank for the purpose of negotiating with
its officers some refinancing plan whereby he might continue
to retain the ranch and have an extension of time for the'
payment of the debt as theretofore reduced. The bank's of-;
ficers refused to carry this property transaction any longer '
on the records as a security arrangement, and they therefore
proposed the following course of procedure: Beeler would
deed the property to the bank and in return the bank would •
execute to Beeler a lease of the premises for the period of
one year at a rental of $3,000 per annum, Beeler to pay all
taxes and maintenance expense on the ranch and '.to have
an option to purchase the land at any time during the terni
of the lease for the sum of $60,000. Beeler accepted this
proposition and by an absolute deed dated September 27,'
1937, he conveyed the property to the bank. As an accompanying instrument, Beeler executed and 'delivered, to, the"
bank his verified affidavit, in which he stated that" said deed'
"is intended to be and is an absolute conveya.nceofthetitle'(
to said premises to the grantee named therein, and was' not;'
and is not now intended as a mortgage, trust conveyance or," '
security of any kind; that it was the intention of affiant as'
grantor in said deed to convey, and by said deed this affiant
did convey to the grantee therein all his right, title arid in~
terest absolutely in and to said premises; that possession of
said premises has been surrendered to the grantee; that in
the execution and delivery of said deed affiant was not act- '
ing under any misapprehension as to the e;fi'ectthereof,and "
acted freely and voluntarily and was not acting under coer- •
cion or duress; that the consideration for said dee'dwas and
is the full cancellation of all debts, obligations; costs and '
charges secured by that certain deed of' trust heretofore
existing on said property, ... arid the reconveyance of said
property under said deed of trust; ... This affidavit is made ;,
for the protection and benefit of the grantee in said deed,
its successors and assigns, ... andparticuhLrly for the benefit of the TITLE INSURANCE AND GUARANTY-COMPANY, which'
is about to insure the title to said property in reliance
thereon, . . ." Pursuant to the terms of this affidavit, the
bank executed a reconveyance under its, trust deed reciting
that the indebtedness thereby secured had been fully paid.

,rrr-:i\'
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On November 5, 1937, both the deed from Beeler and the
reeonveyance were dUly recorded.
As of May 16, 1938, neither installment of the 1937-1938
taxes on the ranch had been fully paid, and on said mentioned day the bank served upon Beeler a notice to pay the
taxes or quit the premises for failure to comply with the
terms of the lease. The parties were unable to settle their
differences on this score and in July, 1938, the bank brought
. suit. in unlawful detainer seeking Beeler's eviction from the
property. In the ensuing trial Beeler succe~sfuny maintained his. defense on the ground that th~ notice of breach
given him was defective, and judgment was rendered accord'
ingly in his. favor.
On October 19, 1938, Beeler commenced this action against
the American Trust Company to have his deed of conveyance
to the defendant bank declared a mortgage to secure the antecedent debt. In his complaint plaintiff alleged that the bank
agreed to reduce the outstanding indebtedness against the
property to the sum of $60,000 to be paid, together with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, within the period
of one year as provided by the terms of the lease, and that
the bank accepted the deed of conveyance as a mortgage to
secure that debt. To this complaint the defendant bank filed
an answer and cross-complaint, denying the material averments of the plaintiff's pleading and asserting that the parties intended the deed to be an absolute transfer of title. to
the property as it in form purported to be, and not a mortgage or other security arrangement. With the principal
controversial issue 'thus defined, the action proceeded to trial,
and at the conclusion thereof the court adopted findings favorable to the plaintiff. Judgment was rendered accordingly
against the defendant bank, determining the plaintiff, C. W.
Beeler, to be the owner in fee of the property in question subject to a mortgage lien as security for the payment of the
following sums: (1) the agreed indebtedness of $60,000, together with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum,
according to the terms expressed in the lease and option agreement; and (2) the first installment of the 1937-1938 taxes,
$477.88, with interest from the date of the entry of the decree
herein. It was further ordered that on receipt of these sums
within the time limitation specified by the court, the defendant bank should reconvey the property to the plaintiff and

19441
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execute and deliver to him a release and: ~atisfacti(;n"Of
lien thus adjudicated. From this judgment' the. 'deferiaant, :
Amerrean Trust Company, prosecutes thiS appeai. . /i' . . ~. . . . .
[1] ,It is without doubt the law, as repeatedly decla~ed:in ' ! '
Our decisions, that clear and convincing evidence'i~' required .
to justify a court in finding that a deed' which:!purpol'ts' to
convey land absolutely in fee simple was. intended to, be, a .
mortgage. ' cc That a deed purporting on its face to. convey ..
the title absolutely may be shown' bY' parol evidence to be
something else--natnely, a mortgage:-:-is: a strik~n:g exception
to the general rule, and it has been universanY)h~ld that,4~e
,character of the instrument cannot. be thus clianged.except
upon clear and convincing evidence." (W Dods ~~. lemen,
130 Cal. 200,203 [62 P. 473] ; see, also, Mahoney'v;]Bostwick,
96 Cal.' 53 [30 P. 1020, 31.Am.St.Rep. 175] ; Sheehan~v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189 [58 P. 543] ; Emery v. Lowe,140 Cal. 379
[73 P. 981]; Wadleigh v. Phelps, 149 CaL 627 [87 ,P., ,93] ;
Oouts v. Winston, 153 Cal. 686 [96 P. 357]; Toddv. Todd,
164 Cal. 255 [128 P. 413] ; Kohn v. Parent, 174 Cal. 570 [163
P. 1008]; Lockhart v. J. H. McDougall 00., 190 .Cal. 308.
(212 P. 1]; Oarlson v, Robinson, 7 Cal.2d 235 [60,P.2d426].)
'!',
But whether or not the evidence offered to change. the ostensible character of the instrument is clear and, convincing
is a question for the trial court to decide. (Mahoney. v. Bostwick, supraj Todd. v. Todd, suprajLockhart. v. J. H.McDougall 00., supraj 17 Cal.Jur. 757, § 59.) In such ca$e, ,as
in others, the determination of that court in favor. of. either
party upon conflicting or contradictory evidence is not open
to review on appeal. (Sherman v. Sandell, 106 Oal. 373 [39
P. 797J; Locke v. Moulton, 132 Cal. 145 [64P., 87] ; Beckman
v. Waters, 161 Cal. 581 [119 P. 922] ; 17 Cal.Jur. 758, § 60.)
As was said in this regard in Wadleigh v. Phelps, supra, at
page 637, "the appellate court ... will not disturb the finding
of the trial court to the effect that the deed is a mortgage,
where there is substantial evidence warranting a clear and
satisfactory conviction to that effect. All questions as to preponderance and conflict of evidence, are for the trial court."
[2a] A review of the record in the light of these rules
",:
does not establish that the finding declaring the deed in 'question to be a mortgage is without sufficient evidentiary support.
In conStruing the disputed financial arrangement, concededly made as the result of the understanding reached be1

."
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1,'.li;
: I .':
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tween the plaintiff and certain officers of the defendant bank
at the aforementioned conference of September 22, 1937, regard must be had at the outset for the parties' course of negotiations at that meeting relative to some appropriate disposition' of the indebtedness secured by the property here
involved under the outstanding deed of trust. In this connection the plaintiff testified at length at the trial, as the following pertinent excerpts from the record will show:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
"MR. CARTER [plaintiff's attorney]: Q. Mr. Beeler, give
us the conversation that took place between yourself and the
representative of the American Trust Company on September
22, 1937.
"A. We all went into the little room, the small board of
directors' meeting room, and sat down. I said, 'I am here
to make some other arrangement than the present arrangement of paying the indebtedness off in 55,000 dollars cash.
I find at this time I can't do it. The principal man that I
had to get financed has been in an accident and had to have
his arm amputated' and has been in the hospital and he just
couldn't do anything for me at that time.' I said, 'I want
the ranch. I want to continue with the ranch. I don't want
you to foreclose on it like this letter says, but is there some
other way that we can do something about it Y Is there some
other arrangement we can make to carry this loan Y' . The
conversation practically altogether was between Mr. Kennedy
and myself. He said, 'There is not any way I can say. You
have got to pay the money. That was the agreement and that
is what we have got to have.' I said, 'Well, I just can't pay
it but there must be some other way.' He said, 'That is the
same old story with this ranch. We just have grief and
trouble with it. We get half way through a deal and something blows up and goes wrong; We can't do anything unless we get some money.' He said, 'Can't you pay us, some
money Y Can't you pay us five thousand' dollars on it. We
want some money on the thing.' I said, 'I need what money
I have to carry me along in my business and so on.' I again
insisted, 'Isn't there some way that we can handle this thing
without you foreclosing on it Y I want to keep the ranch.'
Finally after some words back and forth Mr. Kennedy said,
'The only way I can see for you to do it is to deed us the
property and let us take the title to the property so that we

BEELER
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can write off· this amount of money and this' discount on it.~
I said, 'If you do that will I still get it for the 55,000 dol~
lars?' He said, 'No, we should have 60,000 dollars.' lsaid;,
'Well, if you do that, you ought to reduce the interest froni
six per cent to five per cent.' As I understood all along it
had been six per cent. That was agreeable to Mr. Kennedy ,
and we discussed back and forth how it; COuld be done. I
didn't want to see it that way, but he said, 'That is the only
way we can do it. It has been grief and trouble and the bank
examiners say "You have got to get it off the bOOks as a loan
or foreclose on it or do something about it. " On the one hand
we can't give you title to the property and give you back
a mortgage on it and write off the loss we are going' to take
on it right there. We have got to put it into the real estate
department. That is the way we have got to do it. 'Then we
can write off the loss in the real estate department or get a
new deal later on and get this refinancing over with and we
will have a chance to look at your property in Paradise.' In
the conversation I tried to get him to -take property in Paradise which we have to reduce the indebtedness down. He
said, 'r can't do that. I don't know what the' vallie of ,it is.'
He asked me a lot of questions about it. He said, IWell, if
you want to do it this way now, and deed us the property and'
yoU take a lease and an option back on it for a year, we will:
have time to send somebody baek up and look at the property
and get an appraisal on it and maybe weean take it in that
way. If we can't take it in that way, maybe we .can take it
in as additional security.' I said, 'I don't, want to trade it
in as additional security. One big ranch is ehough to look'after. That is one of the reasons I want to trade 'it. ':rwari1;'
to get rid of the worry and trOUble of that propertY.' ,,'
,;,

"ia. CART~: Q. J~t . : • gi~e th~ substan~e of\vh8:t:*a;rr
said
,-, ;. .;-;, "::',r.
"A.. Mr. Kennedy finally said, 'We wllI'.dO au.:t:'''w~·lillf'
take the deed to the property and give 'you a. lease and' ru{' .
:': ~ .; '.

',~'. ,".

option back on it and that will give us time to inspect the'";
Paradise property and we can carry the deal on tb"at'way':
until we can get these things done, get 'the property inspected?
and see if we ean take it in.' I said, 'If that falls down is::
there some other way that We can do it?' I said, 'I know you 'i
generally ,sell properties for a small down payment' and if :1

InJ\l ". .
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you could get some money on the ranch, like you just said
a while ago, what could we do about that' If this falls down
we can't do it;' He said, 'We have had nothing but grief
and trouble with that thing and we want to get it off of our
books. ' I said, 'If these things don't go through, can I pay
you a payment of five thousand dollars at the end of the
time or during the time and carry the balance of the loan
and make my payment Y' He said, 'We want to settle it and
we will settle it in any kind of a deal at all and if you can
give us some money that is what we asked you both all alol1~.
for some money.' The discussion went on. Mr. Kenned~'
said, 'We don't know you so well. What security can you
give us ,for this interest and taxes so we will know they are
being paid" All we have been getting is promises on this
place for' years.' I said, 'I am making a lease on the grain
land on ,the bottom for forty-five hundred dollars with Her·
sChell.Giles at that time.' That is as far as they had gone.
'I am glad to assign that to you to pay the interest and the
taxes. ' He said, 'You haven't got it yet. You can't assign
something you haven't got. ' We talked back and forth about
that. He said, 'What about the equipment and so on that
you own 7 Will you give us a . chattel mortgage on that to
secure the payment of the interest and taxes until you do get
the Giles lease 7' I said, 'Sure I will.' It was left that way."
"A. I said, 'Is it possible that these negotiations or this
prospective deal to reduce the mortgage down with the Paradise property, if that isn't acceptable to the bank, can I
make some new arrangement or some arrangement now to
make a payment on the indebtedness and then continue with
a new mortgage.' And he said, 'Yes, all we want to do is to
get some money out of that property. All we have ever had
is promises.' And I tried to pin Mr. Kennedy down to if he
would take five thousand dollars and in an off-hand way he
said, 'Yes, some way. We want,to make some kind of a deal.
We want to get some money out of it. We want to know finally that it will be paid off. We don't want it. That is the
onlY,piece of property we have in that country. It is no good
to us there. We have just had a lot of trouble with it.' That
was the gist of the conversation, was the difficulty that had
been had with the property in regard to financing.
"Q. Have you given us the substance of the conversation
that took place that day 1
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"A. After the last end of the convers4tiOlii( why~'. ~ ;,""~""'"
'Well, now, how will we handle these' papers'tog'etthis;.donef
And Mr. Kennedy said, 'I can 't draw them uphe:hHn:
minutes.. It takes time. We are busy. ~ilf.· Ydu:.Will,lb:tLUI5
us in the list of the chattels on the property up there,'per-~,
sonal property, so that we can make out this chattel mortga-ge;
I will draw the papers or have them drawn and ,send; them.,
up to you.' We both agreed then. I asked them .ithat.: they;:;,
were and it was to be a deed and a bill of sale, or;Q,. chattel~
mortgage rather, and the lease and the option.".'.
.
CROSS EXAMINATION
..
.....
1,<J \. .'
'IMR. PLANT [d;fendant's attorneYJ~,.Q~ )~?lW:;,'jV{he~~ yo~,
had that c~nversatlOn 'down there.att,h~?a~K;,p~'f<~~Pt~~per
22, 1937, dIdn't you ask Mr. Kennedy If they'coWdn'~\ J:tt.st.
let .the matter stay in abeyance and y()u:gi'\Te them 8;p.ew"
mortgage?
.'
' , . . , , " . , ':""
"A. Yes.' I asked him if he could carry the 'property· Oii'~8:.·
new mortgage and reduce the amount down to ::fifty-fivetho1i~
sand. .
.' .. ,. .
,

::'.~ .• ~ ': .' ~ .. !:l - ,i

~

'j

"Q. And didn't he say, 'We can't do that. We caii't,do
that because we can't just write offfourteenthorisandand
some odd hundred dollars, write off one mortgage and take
a new one like that' 7
" A. Yea. They couldn't do that on account of bank
aminers or some ruling of the bank or some principle of the·
bank that they didn't want to do it.
"Q. He told you that they couldn't write off some fourteen
thousand dollars and take a new mortgage f
'
"A. No, couldn't take a new mortgage for 55,000.
"Q. I didn't ask you that. Didn't Mr..Kennedysay Jhat
they couldn't write off fourteen thousand and s,ot:rie' odd hw:idred dollars, write off one mortgage andtheit;,tll.'k:e another '.
mortgage Y
.
if" { i .
,
" A. Well, those may have been the words,' yes, 'as I remember. That was the substance of the conversation.
"Q. Yes.
'.
"A. One portion of it, but that isn't all o'::£t, 01 course.
"Q. Didn't Mr. Kennedy at that time advise you they had .
had too much trouble with that ranch already with foreclosures and so forth r
"A. Yes.
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Q. And what h<l would have to do is take a deed and

clear the whole thing up Y
I I A. Well, he told me, after the course of a lot of conversation, he said that was the only way he would refinance it
lor me, was to take a deed.
"Q. That is the only thing he would do, was to take a deed
.the property and clear the whole thing up'
"c A. Well, I see you are reading from my deposition, yes.
'probably said those words and that was probably the intent
df. the conversation, was to clear the thing up and give it
• new lien on life.
"Q. And they would give you back a lease and an option'
"A. Yes, that was the final conversation.
• I Q. That is what he said, was it not Y
"A. Yes.
"Q. Now at that time was there any discussion as to
whether or not the Weiss indebtedness, that is the 74,000
dollar indebtedness, would be satisfied or cancelled 1
"A. Well, there might have been some little discussion but
it didn't impress me very much at all as I can remember.
There might have been some.
"' Q. Wasn't the substance of that discussion this, that
when you gave them the deed to the property they would
cancel, that is, wipe out, the indebtedness that Mr. Weiss
owed them!
"A. That was my impression. It would be, naturally.
When they took it, they would have to wipe that out in order
to give me a new mortgage. That probably was said, yes.
"Q. SO that you understood that that indebtedness was to

be cancelled'!
'
"A. Oh, I didn't-- nothing was promised me to that
effect at all that I can recall.
"' Q. But that was the substance of the discussion'
"A. I suppose that was some of the substance of the discussion.
"MR. PLANT [Reading from plaintiff's deposition portions
of testimony relative to the disposition of the Weiss indebtedness]
:
"
I A. [by Mr. Beeler) Well, before that I was in the bank
there at one time, I don't recall what time it was. We were
discussing about that fifty-three acres in the bottom land
which was clear and they pulled out their folder there. I saw
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them. It was either Jerry Kennedy or it was right there{ .'.
by him and they showed me where they had a deed all ready
for Mr. Weiss to sign to the ranch and to the fifty-three acres'
besides, which was supposed to be free and clear or was free' ..
and clear, so far as I was concerned.
'
.
" 'Q. [by Mr. Plant] Did he tell you what that deed was
.
,
. ,
going to be for?
I I I A. They were going to take it from Henry . Weiss ill
lieu of his indebtedness. That was before I made a deal with
Henry Weiss.
.
.
" 'Q. That was in satisfaction of his indebtedness'
. !'
" 'A. That's what Henry Weiss was going to do.'
"Now is that statement correct T
"' A. That was my understanding, Mr. Plant; for them taking the deed. There wasn't anything said that they were to'. .
cancel the indebtedness and they didn't go into that at .all
but they just said, 'We have the deeds prepared for Henry
Weiss to sign here,' and they did show me the deeds.
.
"Q. Was the statement I have just read you correct!
"A. Yes, that I saw the deeds in there and that they would
.
take the deeds for the property from Henry Weiss.
"Q. They were going to take that. deed in lieu of the indebtedness.
"A. I said that voluntarily, Mr. Plant, that I assumed that
is what they were doing it for and I still assume that is why
they would take the deed. They didn't tell me that is what
they would do it for.
"Q. You knew that their taking a deed from you would
have the same effect, is that correct Y
"A. No. Why should I pay five thousand dollars for &
deed a couple of months before and then just give it. away
for nothing Y [Beeler had given Weiss a $5,000 promiss9Ty
note and assumed Weiss' obligation in return for the deed
from Weiss.]
. ,
"Q. Isn't it a fact that you knew when' they took the deed"
from you they were going to cancel your indebtedness f' ':: ...
"A. No. I didn't know that.
. ........ .·~!!./':l)};,;.!•. '''.'
" Q. Well, I will call your attention ~agabito your'd~~osl'"
tion:... I will ask you if these questions were' asked
driil,.
these answers given Y
.
..
'.
::;. '.. !. .', "'!.,: :.'~
'.'
.
'"
...... :; ,..:
.. " {,\
...
" 'Q. Now, was anything said about the'dispositioii'to p~~:'
made of Mr. Weiss' notes during that conversation' ' ,,,I
'.
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.'
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" 'A. Well, it was to be that when I gave them the deed to
the property, why, then they would cancel~ well, that was
automatically wiped out, the indebtedness that Mr. Weiss
owed them. That' was about all the discussion there was
about
that.'
"Was
that your testimony at the taking of your deposition'
"A. Yes, that was my testimony, because I was assuming

the indebtedness."
In summarization of the foregoing testimony, it may
fairly be said that it ,shows that incident to the plaintiff's
purchase 'of the ranch on July 28, 1937, and his assumption
of his grantor's obligation to discharge the existing debt
thereon, he had been attempting for some months to work
out some feasible plan with the bank for a reduction of the
loan; that the finitncial backing on which he relied to. meet
the terms of the bank's $55,000 cash discount proposition of
June, 1937', did' not materialize within the time scheduled;
that in response to the bank's notice of default and election
to sell under its deed of trust, served upon him on September 1; 1937, he visited the bank on September 22, 1937, to
"make some other arrangement than the present arrangement of paying the indebtedness off in 55,000 dollars cash";
that he discussed his problem of carrying the loan and continuing with the ranch, with several officers of the bank, but
principally with Mr. Kennedy, the vice-pre!'i.ient in the real
estate loan department, who offered as the only alternative
to immediate foreclosure a refinancing scheme whereby the
bank I ' could write off the loan on the books" by taking a deed
of the property and giving plaintiff a one-year lease with
the option to purchase the ranch at any time during that
period; that plaintiff did not want the transaction handled
that way, but the bank's officers insisted on this form of procedure as plaintiff's only recourse; that the indebtedness was
thereupon fixed at $60,000 instead of the previous discount
figure of $55,000 because of the time extension commensurate
with the option provision, and the rental was set at an amount
equivalent to 5 per cent interest per annum on the aforesaid
$60,000, or $3,000, payable semi-annually; that as security
for his payment of said interest and the taxes on the property for the ensuing year, plaintiff agreed to give the bank
a chattel mortgage on certain equipment on the ranch. with
the understanding that such mortgage would be returned
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. to him upon his assigning to the bank a leMe which he was
then .negotiating with respect to a portion of the ranch property; that 'plaintiff had a tract of land in Paradise, California, which he wanted the bank to consider aBa"basis~or',)a
reduction of the indebtedness in question; that m:Kenn.'edy.
agreed to have an appraisal' of the Paradise property made
some time during the course of the year and aCCOrding to 'the.
valuation so established, the bank would "take ·it;iri" either,
"to reduce the debt" or "asadditionaZ security;";: ", "'<';f
Corroborative of the plaintiff's recital'of the' p'arties'nego•. '
tiations as c6ncerned only with the effectuation Of. '$lome :new,
security arrangement which the plaintiff could !4a:ndIe; Su~•..
cessfully is the testimony of a Mr. Browri, 'plaintiff's:banker;,r
who was present during most of the conferenc~ orl)Septe'rriber;;:.
22, 1937. This witness, when asked to givehfs'recollectioh
of what occurred at the meeting, testified.'as fc:>ilows·~.;!~'Wel)~:
it appeared that Mr. Beeler had acquired a::piEic~f;bf·property:.,
on which the American Trust Company held if,cfee'd'·o:hr1i~t.,:
The American Trust Company had filed· noti6e ofbre~cli'
Mr. Beeler was there for tl1e purpose o:fiendeavO'ririgJi~.r;tti;?
finance' it, get an extension or something: of that :sort,- arldi.li.ll, .•••..
the time I was there it centered aroundthis\deedof;trUst)~i'.'
A few days following this meeting between the 'parties,' the:
bank forwarded to plaintiff for his' execution~ a deed' of 'con~'.
veyance, a bill of sale of certain personal property (in the
ranch in lieu of the chattel mortgage' theretofore specified,
and a lease and option agreement-all documentswhfch the
parties had discussed in their previous negotiationS, and which
the plaintiff admittedly signed without questi'oD.;' -'However,
with these papers the bank also sent.tothe' plahitiff[for sig{
nature an affidavit certifying, according to the pettineittfpr():,
visions thereof above quoted,' the' na'tureof .th~' tran'Satltion
as an absolute conveyance of title to property iD. compi~te'
satisfaction and cancellation of an' exiSting indebtt~dness
the'reon. Nothing had previously been said by any of the
bank officials indicating that the bank wouid ask for, or
would require any such affidavit. The plaintiff testified that
before signing this affidavit he telephoned to the bank alid
discussed the document with Mr. McIntyre, an assistant Vice~
president, who had prepared the necessary papers for the
closing of the transaction, as follows: "I asked him what the.
meanIng of the aftidavitwas, that there was' nothing sldd
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about it before. He said, 'We have to have that ,to clear up
the title, so it is all right and we can put it in the real estate
department. The bank always takes those.' I didn't think
anything about it. I said, 'If you have to have it, that is
O.K. I will sign it.' So I did." At the trial upon' both
direct and cross-examination with respect to this matter, Mr.
McIntyre admitted that he told the plaintiff at the time in
question that the affidavit was needed to satisfy a requirement of the title company before it would issue a title policy
upon the property free of exceptions and that the bank was
acting only as "an intermediary in the matter." On its face
the affidavit in part sustains this statement as to its purpose,
for it expressly provides: "This affidavit is made ... particularly for the benefit of the TITLE INSURANCE AND GUARANTY
COMPANY, which is about to insure the title to said property
in reliance thereon."
Also bearing on this matter is the following testimony of
the plaintiff as to a conversation he had with Mr. McGlynn,
an officer of the title company, before the transaction was
finally closed: "We discussed, I told him rather , that this
land was clear and so on, that I was deeding it all to the
bank to refinance the loan, the way they wanted to do it.
He said, 'You have given this affidavit. That takes you out,
doesn't it?' I said, 'Why, no, I have a lease and an option
and it is a form of refinancing.' He asked, 'What about this
revenue stamp on the deed, where you are giving them the
deed to the property l' I said, 'There is no need of any revenue stamp on it at all, because it is just given to refinance
the thing.' He said, 'You refuse to put the revenue stamp
on ¥' I said, 'Certainly I do.' He said, 'I will have to take
that up with the bank.' He said, 'You have your lease and
option. I don't want to see them.' I said, 'Why7' He said,
'We can't write a policy of title insurance if you aren't
moving off the place and giving possession and turning that
place over to them, if you aren't selling it to them.' I flaid,
'I am not selling it to them.' He said, 'Then I will have to
write to our attorneys in San .Francisco and advise them to
make an exception to the property.' I said, 'Well, that is
the story. I am not moving off the property.' He said, 'Are
they paying you any money for it Y' I said, 'Absolutely not
a cent. They don't have to becaUse I am just doing it to
refinance.' " Consistent with the tenor of this conversation
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the title company thereafter issued its policye~re~sl~~:~;>:
cepting ,jany rights of C. W. Beeler, whois iripossessiori~,'.:7,:"
significantly without reference to his occupancy
the pr6:p~:
erty as a lessee-and the bank accepted the policy' in thi8 "
form, although it had previously indicated it wanted the title '
certificate free of such exception.
Other matters of some relevancy in considering thestat~
of the parties as the result of their consummation of the
presently disputed transaction appear from the record::
While the testimony relative to the value of the property
is in direct conflict, the estimate of the plaintiff and his witnesses supports the trial court's finding that the ranch was
worth "in excess of $135,000." [3] This accredited evi~
dence indicating the extent of the inequality between the
worth of the property and the consideration stated in the
conveyance, to wit, $60,000, the amount claimed by the b8.nk .
to accord with its appraisal figure, is a "strong circumstance"
tending to show that the deed was intended to operate as a.
mortgage. (Husheon v. Husheon, 71 Cal. 407 [12 P. 410] ;
Emery v. Lowe, 140 Cal. 379 [73 P. 981] ; Lockhart v. J.I1.
McD01tgall 00., 190 Cal. 308 [212 P. 1] ; Reynolds v. Hook,
109 Cal.App. 226 [292 P. 1000] ; see, aIso, annotation i:ri. .9~
A.L.R. 953-963; 17 Cal.Jur. 788, § 88.) [4] Moreover,the
yearly rental value of the property stands uncontroverted in,
the record as "in excess of $7,500" and the trial court.so
found, yet under the terms of the plaintiff's' lease with the
bank the sum denominated rental for the premises was but
$3,000 per year-a disparity of some significance, particuJarly in view of the further evidence that such sum was
fixed by the bank at an amount equivalent to the interest
rate of 5 per cent per annum on the indebtedness at the, reduced figure of $60,000 and payable semi-annually. This,
too, eonstitutes a "strong circumstance" tending to show that
the "rent" under the lease agreement was in reality an interest payment consistent with the character of· the transaction as a loan. (Oouts v. Winston, 153 Cal. 686 [96 P. 357];
17 Oal.Jur. 786, § 86.) [5] Still another matter to be ,here
noted is the fact that after the recordation of the deed from .
the plaintiff, the instrument purportedly given in extinguishment of the existing i'ndebtedneFl.'!, the bank continu.ed· to retain in its possession the two promiRsorynotes-one ..for
$60,000 and the other for $14,40O-evidencing the debt,;86!-
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cured by the aforementioned trust deed made by 'the plaintiff's grantor and expressly assumed by the plaintiff in the
terms of his purchase of the property. While it appears that
following said recordation the bank made certain entries and
transfers on its records designed to indicate full payment of
the debt, endorsed on the back of the $60,000 note "We have
acquired title by deed. Note cancelled" and "wrote off" the
$14,400 note as a loss, such bookkeeping procedure of itself
is no more effectual to establish the discharge of the debt than
would be the act of the payee in writing the word "Paid"
across the face of the note, without relinquishment thereof
to the maker. There being no delivery of the notes either
to Mr. Weiss, the plaintiff's grantor, or to the plaintiff himself, the mentioned notations of the bank in this regard have
no force or effect here. (Wittman v. Pickens, 33 Colo. 484
[81 P. 299] ; Hanna v.McCrory, 19 N.M. 183 [141 P. 996] ;
First State Bank of Hilger v. Lang, 55 Mont. 146 [174 P.
597, 9 A.L.R. 1139].)
[2b] As to the parties' conduct subsequent to the financial arrangement in question, the following evidence is pel,'tinent: In December, 1937, a great flood occurred
the
Sacramento River, as the result of which many permanent
improvements on the property here involved were damaged
or destroyed. The plaintiff testified that he communicated the
magnitude' of his loss to certain officers of the bank, that he
asked them for a loan-not a contribution-;-of money to de·
fray the expense of repair 8,nd reconstruction, that they declined to give him the financial assistance he requested, and
that he expended approximately the sum of $3,000 in making
the necessary structural replacements on the ranch. While
the terms of the lease required the plaintiff during the term
thereof to make ordinary repairs on the property I his undertaking a program of improvements on the scale intimated by
the mentioned outlay of expense is a factor substantiating
his claim of continued occupancy of the property as owner.
The plaintiff further testified that in the course of one of his
conversations with the officers of the bank relative to the
:flood damage, he mentioned that he cont~mplated selling some
276 walnut trees growing on the ranch; that they agreed with
him that the removal of such trees would improve the property and that he should keep the proceeds from such sale;
that he consummated the sale for the sum of $1,800, which
amount he retained without objection from the bank. This

in
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arrangement as detailed by the plaintiff was not contradicted
by the bank, and it, too, reflects the plaintiff's exercise of the
rights of ail owner in relation to the ranch property. Also',
to be n{)ted here is the fact that some few months after the
negotiations of the parties on September 22, 1937, resulting
in the financial· plan now in controversy, the. plaintiff made
two leases of different portions of the propertY.7 one for·
$2,750 .and the other for $4,500-the latter,inaccordance
with the parties' understanding on the date mentioned,. being
assigned by the pfaintiff to the bank in payment ofliiS,afore-:
said yearly rental charge of $3,000, and the second i~stall-.
ment of the 1937-1938 taxes on the ranch. The plaintiff. di~
cussed both of these lease propositions with the officers of the, .
bank at the meeting of September 22, 1937 " alid,as ultimately:
concluded, they both were executed as leases,nofaa sub-IeaS'es,:
of a tenant in possession of property.
. ,.. , .. , ':" .. " ',,:.
Also to be noted at this point is the plaintiff's 'testimony
relative to a conversation had with a rep~esentative{)f,:the,
bank in January, 1938, regarding the,appraisa(ofhisPara~,
dise p r o p e r t y . " " ..."." "<,:';;
~ 1."
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. "MR. CARTE:a: Q. State what the'conversationi ,w8.s"[witH;) .
Mr. Kennedy].
.
'i r<
,\JJ11 ~ihY/IV(~~]
"A. I asked him, 'What did Mr. , Ell)erg';[th)ibanlf'i1 :
appraiser] report on the valuation' of'the'p'i'dperffjfilna1w6~ir
they still take it in to reduce the amount;ofJh:~n~l l"in\'ed!:
them. ' He said, 'The only way we can take it 'in is 'as additional'
security.' I said, 'I don't want togiveyo{f any', additional'
security. I want to get rid of the place' and pay iOn onthiit
property, .theZoan that lowe you.' He sa1d;'Wii 'cari't'%>' '.
.that but we will take it in as additiondt '$ecurity;'~ \thicl('/F
refused to d o . " \ C , ,,'H'. i!JI/! ~,JJ)
"Q. As additional security for th~'
;'I';;,)i!T,
"A. Sixty thousand dollars.' , ". ",., "" \(';
iii
"Q. Was that subsequent to the 27tli day of Septembe~;"
19377
' ..: ' , ..11
..
.
·:t
"A. Yes, it was in January of 1938."
CRoss-ExAMINATION"
,; "",".; "
"MR. PLANT: Q. Now when you werit':do-wn)~iJ'd\iklk~~{'
to Mr. Kennedy, as you
say, about this Paradise
pr()perty'you:'
.
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referred to 'the loan which lowe you and to my indebtedness to you,' did you Y
"A. Again, Mr. Plant, I won't say those were the exact
words but in substance that is about it.
'''Q. As a matter of fact, neither the word 'loan' or the
word 'indebtedness' were ever used, were they'
: "A. Yes, Mr. Plant, they were used and have been from
the beginning, until they decided they wanted to get it away
from me."
While much of the foregoing recital is based upon evidence
introduced on behalf of the plaintiff and in some important
respects is flatly contradicted by witnesses for the defendant
bank-particularly in regard to the purpose of the financial
arrangement made by the parties at the conference of September 22, 1937, as a cancellation of the existing indebtednesS on the ranch rather than another loan transaction-it
must be remembered that all questions of preponderance and
conflict of evidence are for the trial court. That court had
the right to accept the plaintiff's version of this controversial
Ihatter aB true, and apparently did so. Thus accepted, it was
plainly sufficient to justify the finding that the deed in question WaB intended as a mortgage to secure the antecedent
debt as discounted by the bank in formulating the refinancing
plan with the plaintiff. In view of this accredited evidence
relative to a continuing, subsisting loan, the following language from the case of Ohapman v. Hicks, 41 Cal.App. 158,
162-163 [182 P. 336] is pertinent: "The test of a mortgage
is whether the relation of debtor and creditor continues so
that there is a subsisting debt after the conveyance [citing
cases]; and where a deed, absolute on its face, is given to
secure a debt, it will be held to be a mortgage even though
the parties stipulate it shall be an absolute conveyance.
([Citing] Hodgkins v. Wright, 127 Cal. 688 [60 P. 431] .... ) .
The intention of the parties must govern, and it matters not
what particular form the transaction may take. If the deed
is made for the purpose of securing the payment of a debt,
it is a mortgage, 'no matter how strong the language of the
deed, or any instrument accompanying it, may be.' ([Citing]
Woods "V. Jensen, 130 Cal. 200 [62 P. 473].)"
[6] Nor is a different principle applicable here because
the plaintiff executed contemporaneously with his deed an
affidavit declaring the transaction to be an absolute conveyance and not intended as a mortgage. While the authorities
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in this country are divided with' reference . '
whether a deed and an accompanying memorandumio:t!agree'~i:
ment, or option of resale to the grantor, may'be';
parol evidence to be'a mortgage where the termS 'of
orandum unambiguously negative the existence,·.of 'an'ind~ __ ,
edness '(see elaborate annotation of cases on the subJect in"
111 A.L.R. 448), it is the settled law of this state not to,hold
such writing a conclusive criterion of the chl1racter~ of ,the
transaction. In Vance v. Anderson, 113 Cal. 532, 538 [45P.
816] this court set forth the basic doctrine asfollow$:' in ,A:
deed absolute on its face may bc shown, byparol;;~obe ,in-"
tended as a mortgage. It may be stated, as a generalpropo~
sition, that in this state, at least, every conveyanceof:reaI
property made as security for the performan~e of ,.an obli~ , " .'
gation is,in equity, a mortgage, irrespective o'fthe form in '
which. it is made. Equity looks beyond the'mere form in
which th,e transaction is clothed, and shapes, its relief in such
way as to carry out the true intent of the parties to the agree~
ment, and to this end all the facts and circumstances of the
transaetion, the conduct of the parties thereto, and their declarations against their own interests, their relations to one
another, and to ,the subject matter, are subjects for consider~
ation. [Citing cases.]" In thus regarding "all the facts
and circumstances of the transaction" so as to execute the
real intention of the parties, the rule prevents either of the
parties to the disputed instrument committing a fraud on
the other by claiming it as an absolute conveyance, notwithstanding it WaB given and accepted as security.. "To inSist
on what was really a mortgage, as a sale, is in equity' a fraud'
which cannot be successfully practiced under the shelter. of
any written papers, however precise and complete they may" ' '
appear to be." (Italics added.) Peninsular Trading & .FiSh-'
ing Oompany v. Pacific Steam Whaling Oompany, 123· Cal.·
689, 694 [56 P. 604].)
.
.
The defendant bank's citation of the early case of People
ex rel. Ford v. Irwin (1861), 18 Cal. 117, in support of its
argument that in this jurisdiction parol evidence may not be
received to vary or dispute the terms of a written instru,.
ment concerning the purpose of executing a deed, is of no
avail here. That case involved a deed absolute and a coritract to reconvey. One Arnold owed the plaintiff,' Ford, the
sum of $8,600. Arnold conveyed the real property in question by grant, bargain and sale deed to Ford, who, at the
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same time delivered to Arnold a written agreement to reconvey the property, in which it was stipulated: "This shall only
be treated as a contract to convcy, and not as an acknowledgment that said conveyance from Arnold and wife to myself was intended as a mortgage. " The opinion does not refer
to any ruling upon the admission or exclusion of parol evidence, but discusses the problem as one of the proper construction of the instruments in the light of the evidence
which had been received. Thus, it was held that evidence that
the actual consideration for the deed was a pre-existing indebtedness equal in amount to the sum required to be paid
upon a reconveyance of the property was sufficient to impress
upon the deed the character of a mortgage "unless controlled
by the clause referred to in the contract" (that is, the stipulation above quoted) j that the object of the clause was to
"repel" any and all presumptions which the law would otherwise have indulged in relation to the deed, and that there
was "no doubt that the parties could, by a provision for that
purpose, exclude all extraneous circumstances" affecting the
character of the transaction j that such clause in the contract
did not take away or interfere in any respect with the efficacy of the contract, but simply repelled "any presumption
from outside facts, giving· to it an operation different from
that intended by the parties."
To the extent that the discussion in the Ford case would
limit the court to the consideration of only the deed and the
accompanying written instrument, without regard for other
evidence in the case, in determining the. real nature of the
disputed transaction, it is inconsif;ltent with the import of
the ,subsequently adopted code provision on the subject and
cannot be approved. Section 2924 of the Civil Code from
the date of its original enactment in 1872 has provided that
every transfer of an interest in property, other than in trust,
made only as a security for the performance of another act,
is to be deemed a mortgage. In' accord with the implication
of this statutory pronouncement, it was properly recognized,
in Vance v. Anderson (1896), supra, that a collateral written
agreement declaring that a contemporaneously executed deed
should be treated as an absolute conveyance, and not as a
mortgage, was not conclusive but only one of the facts and
cir<lumstances of the transaction worthy of consideration in
determining the real intention of the parties. If by' a separate writing the parties expressly agree, at the same time

Co.
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an absolute deed is executed, t4at it Is what' it 'purportS c.&,~,
be, that is, an absolute sale, tha~ would' benoinore .~~n;
what the deed itself says. Therefore, if they eQuld thnsavoid
its real effect as a mortgage, the true natureo! such ,8 tran~
saction could never be shown, and the policy of the law n'ever;
to permit a security to be converted by any contemporaneou$
agreement into a sale could be constantly evaded. (Civ~
Code, §§ 2924, 2925 j Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116; Wehle
v. Price, 202 Cal. 394 [260 P. 878J; Oarlson v. RobinsOn,,7
Cal.2d 235 [60 P .2d 426 J.) The right of a mortgagee to become the purchaser of the equity is unquestioned, but the
relations of the parties are such' that the transaction will be
carefully scrutinized to prevent the effectuation of some de~
vice whereby the debtor under .the force of neceSsitoUs cir.
cumstances is deprived of his, right of redemption. (Oiv.
Code, § 2889 j Russell v. Southard, 12 lIow. (U.S.), i39 "[13
L.Ed. 927] j Peugh v.' Davis, 96 U.S. 332 [24' t.Eid.775]i
Bradbury v. Davenport, 114 Cal. 593 [46 P. 1062, 55 Am.St.
Rep. 92J j Jones on Mortgages, §§ 251, 1045.) The rule in
such a case is said to be substantially. the same as that pre~ ,
vaiIing when the deed of a beneficiary to his trustee is, ques~
tioned. (Villa v. Rodriguez, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 323 [20, L.Ed.
406J j Bradbury v. Davenport, supra.)
, ,'
"
A situation presenting considerations strikingly" akin. to
those here involved was recently before the appellate ,court,
in the second decision in Davis v. Stewart, 53,Cal.App.2d439
[127 P.2d 1014] and adjudicated, in accordance ~th,~the
views hereinabove expressed. There, as here,::ii,deed ,absolute
on its· face was claimed to be only amortmi(;As,'a'il~i:t,p,~
the transaction in which the deed was given; the'gi~~rttOi'a'ri(i
grantee entered into an elaborate,. Written" aIP-eei;n,en,t,
among other things provided: Ott)s'understo4iI
that :£irst party shall become, ,'upon'executioh'ana:
of said deed the absolute owner ,of :sald
with all improvements thereon and' that',
not constitute a mortgage, subject oiiIyho'Wl
option for said :£ive-year period." . ,(See ,rediial
Stewart, 81 Cal.App.2d 574, 576[88P:2d7841.(
tion, the trial court admitted oral itestiniony'ft'o'th~
notwithstanding the declarations, of "thti.'cohtempC:i.raneoffi.
writing, the' deed was in fact'intendeaas' 'se:cuHiYtJ'
payment of a debt, 'l"hereafterfiridings were:i:tJ.ade''b:t'accbrd~'
,f
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ance with the oral evidence, and the judgment establishing
the deed as a mortgage was affirmed. The defendant bank
argues that the situation in the Davis case is distinguishable
because the written agreement there did not expressly provide, as does the affidavit here, that the deed "was not and
is not now intended ., . as security of any kind ... " and
hence evidence extrinsic to the writing was properly received
to remove the uncertainty as to whether or not the disputed
instrument was given in satisfaction of the antecedent indebtedness. That is but a tenuous distinction and will not bear
close scrutiny. In both cases the import of the contemporaneous writing is the same-the negation of a security arrangement incident to the subsistence of the debt-and whether
one writing amplifies by detailed recitals the purported purpose of the parties to execute an absolute transfer of title
to the property involved is an immaterial consideration. Certllinly, in neither instance is the language of the accompanying instrument so obscure as to require extrinsic evidence for
its explanation or understanding. And, in one case as in the
other, the declaration of the writing would not be held controlling unless it should appear upon complete evidence that
it was in harmony with t t aU the facts and circumstances of
the transaction." (Vance v. Anderson, supra.)
In concluding the discussion of this phase of the present
appeal, it is sufficient to state that the circumstances of the
whole case, as reflected by the evidence accredited in the
trial court, are entirely consistent with the view that the
defendant bank, while in fact agreeing on a loan to be secured by mortgage, was desirous, for reasons of certain.interdepartmental requirements connected with its routine bookkeeping procedure, of giving the transaction a different appearance by recording it as an absolute transfer of title. Such
cases cited by the defendant bank as Henley v. Hotaling, 41
Cal. 22; Farmer v. Grose, 42 Cal. 169; Woods v. Jensen, 130
Cal. 200 [62 P. 473] ; Wehle v. Price, 202 Cal. 394 [260 P.
878] ; and Goodfellow v. Goodfellow, 219 Cal. 548 [27 P.2d
898], wherein an absolute deed was sustained as such in the
face of the claim that it was intended by the parties as a
mortgage, merely rest upon an affirmance of the trial court's
judgment as based upon substantial evidence and thus do
not conflict with the fundamental premise of this opinion as to
an appellate court's function in reviewing the record to determine whether challenged findings lack evidentiary support.
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[7] There is no force here to the contention of the defen- ,
dant bank that there was no consideration for the agreement
for the reduction of the indebtedness as claimed by the plaintiff to have been made between the parties at the basic con~
ference of September 22, 1937, as aforesaid. In theflrst
place, the record discloses that the trial court found. on substantial evidence that at said meeting the parties concluded
with respect to various phases of the contemplated financial
arrangement a number of reciprocal" agreements, of which
one concerned the understanding as to the discount of the
existing debt; that as the result of theSe integrated negotiations the deed jn question was executed and the parties have
acted thereunder, though in dispute as to the real purpose
of the conveyance. [8] But regardless of this observation,
the record further shows that this matter of lack of consideration was not pleaded in the trial court, that the ca~ waS
tried on other issues entirely and as if such point did not
enter into the case; consequently, such objection may not
properly be raised for the first time on appeal. (2 Cal.Jur.
234-235, § 67; Los Angeles Inv. 00. v. Home Soo. Bank, 180
Cal. 601 [182 P. 293, 5 A.L.R. 1193].)
[9] Two additional questions presented by the record require some discussion. The first of these relates to the payment" of taxes on the property involved. As above stated,
the lease agreement expressly placed this obligation upon the
plaintiff during the one-year period therein specified-October 1, 1937, to September 30, 1938. With regard to the first
installment of the 1937-1938 taxes, the record discloses that
the plaintiff on November 30, 1937, received from the bank
a letter enclosing the bill for the taxes covering the real property and stating that the bill covering a separate assessment
with respect to certain personal property on th"e ranch had
been forwarded to the plaintiff's grantor, Mr. Weiss, who was
responsible therefor; that on December 3, 1937, the plaintiff
gave the tax collector his check for the amount of the real
property taxes; that subsequently the tax collector notified
the bank as to the receipt of the plaintiff's check, but stated
that such segregable amount of the entire tax bill could not
be accepted until payment of the personal property assessment was made; that the bank suggested to the plaintiff by
letter that he pay the balance of the tax bill and deduct that
amount from Ii. certain sum he then owed to Mr. Weiss in
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connection with the purchase of the ranch; that the plaintiff
did nothing further in the matter and on April 25, 1938, his
check for the real property taxes was returned to him by the
tax collector; that the bank on May 16, 1938, served on the
plaintiff a notice to quit the premises for breach of his lease,
and subsequently commenced unlawful detainer proceedings.
The plaintiff testified that in June, 1938, he called at the
defendant bank and offered to pay the delinquent taxes, including those on the personal property in question, if the
bank would not prosecute the eviction proceedings; that he
then had sufficient money in his bank account to substantiate
his offer of payment; and that the officers of the defendant
bank refused to accept his proposition. As previously noted,
the unlawful detainer action resulted in a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff herein because of the defect in the notice of
breach with respect to the amount of his tax liability. In
view of this evidence the trial court properly concluded that
the defendant bank should be reimbursed to the extent of its
payment of the first installment of the real property taxes,
$477.88, but that the running of interest on such sum was
stopped by virtue of the plaintiff's offer of payment made in
good faith and with ability to perform. (Civ. Code, § 1485.)
[10] As to the second installment of the 1937-1938 taxes,
there arises the question of the effect of the plaintiff's assignment of a certain lease to the bank in discharge of this obligation. The plaintiff testified that at the aforesaid conference of September 22, 1937, he agreed to assign to the bank
"to pay the interest [rent] and the taxes" a lease he was
then negotiating with respect to a portion of the ranch; that
such assignment was accordingly made "to pay up all of the
three thousand dollars and the second half of the taxes in
full" ; that following the bank's acceptance of the assignment
he was given it "receipt for all the payments, the interest
payments" that he owed it. While certain witnesses for the
defendant bank stated at the trial that the assignment was
taken only as security for the amount of the rental charge
and the specified tax installment, the instrument itself purports to be absolute on its face and apparently the court so
construed it in accordance with the plaintiff's positive testimony in the matter. Accordingly, the trial court's finding
to the effect that the assignment was in full payment of the
aforesaid second installment of taxes, as well as for the
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rental charge of $3,000 under the terms of the lease agreement, is binding on this appeal, and the defendant bank's
claim that the plaintiff is indebted to it in the amount of
said tax installment cannot be sustained.
However, the record further establishes, and the plaintiff
so concedes, that pending the trial of this action the defendant bank paid the first installment of the 1938-1939 taxes
amounting to $430 on the real property here involved. Apparently the trial court inadvertently failed to make any finding as to this matter. Since there is no question as to the
validity of the bank's claim for reimbursement for this expenditure, we are authorized under section 956a of the Code of
Civil Procedure to supply the missing finding. We, therefore,
find" That the defendant, American Trust Company, paid the
first installment of the 1938-1939 taxes on said real property,
amounting to the sum of $430, and that pursuant to the
agreement of the parties, it was the duty of the plaintiff to
pay said first installment, and said defendant should be reimbursed ~or its payment thereof; that there is now due and
owing from the plaintiff to the defendant, American Trust
Company, the sum of $430, but without interest thereon because of said defendant's refusal of the offer of payment
hereinafter in these findings referred to." (Finding to be
numbered XXVIIIa.)
The defendant, having paid the sum of $430 On a~count
of the taxes due for the year 1938-1939, as well as the sum
of $477.88 on account of the taxes for the previous year, is
entitled to be reimbursed in the aggregate amount of $907.88.
For the purpose of making the findings harmonize, it is
further necessary to modify Finding XXXIV by strikmg
out subdivision 2 thereof and inserting in its place the following:
,
"2. The sum of $907.88, being the amount of taxes
said real property for the years 1937-1938 and 1938-1939
paid by the said defendant, American Trust Company, together with legal interest upon said amount from the date
of entry of the decree in this action."
.
The conclusions of law are also modified so as to meet these
changes in the findings of fact.
.
The second and final point presented for determinatio:q
relates to the proper allowance of interest .to be made, to .the.
defendant bank with reference to the adjudicatedlnort~~ge
indebtedness of $60,000. It is claimed by the plainilif and
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found by the trial court that a tender of this amount was
made to the defendant bank some few months before due
under the parties' agreement and that because of such tender
and refusal thereof, the bank is not entitled to interest from
that date. (Civ. Code, § 1504.) The defendant bank contends that the tender, if in fact made, was insufficient to stop
the running of interest.
[11] The finding of the trial court upon the matter of
tender is substantially as follows: That on June 20, 1938, at
the defendant bank the plaintiff offered to pay his indebtedness in good faith, and was ready, willing and able to do so;
that prior to that date plaintiff had entered into an arrangement with one MacArthur whereby the latter had agreed to
advance to plaintiff the amount of money necessary to pay
the indebtedness; that said MacArthur was financially able
to make the requisite advancement, and was ready and willing to do so; that this offer was made to Mr. Kennedy, vicepresident of the bank; that said Kennedy refused that offer
without specifying any objection to its form, and refused to
deal with the plaintiff in the matter in any way, 'but demanded that the plaintiff vacate the property within thirty
days; that by virtue of its said officer's actions the defendant bank waived objection to the mode of the offer and
waived tender or other offer; that such offer of performance
suspended the running of interest upon the indebtedness.
This finding is in strict accord with the plaintiff's evidence on the subject. In regard to his interview with Mr.
Kennedy on the day mentioned, the plaintiff testified as follows: "Well, I went into the bank. He [Kennedy] was sitting at his desk.... He apparently-well, he was sore because
I came in. He told me before he didn't want to deal with
me. I said, 'I will come in. I have a man by the name of
Roderick MacArthur that will give me enough money that
I can liquidate this indebtedness and I want to talk to you
about it and see what we can do to get it closed up.' He
said, 'I don't want to talk to you. You get out of this bank.
We have had nothing but trouble with you and all these
leases and everything and I don't want to talk to you at all.
We want you to get off of that ranch and if you are not off
in thirty days we will put you off.' I tried to talk further.
I tried to say something, and he walked off and said, 'I don't
want to talk to you. You get out of here.''' Mr. MacArthur
corroborated the plaintiff's statement with respect to their

Apr. 1944J

BEELER V.

AMv'RICAN TRUST Co.
[24 0.24 11

29

prior arrangement for the necessary advance of money, and
added that he was financially able to discharge the indebtedness at the time he so agreed to assist the plaintiff. While
Mr. Kennedy on behalf of the bank gave an entirely different
account of the conversation had with the plaintiff on the day
in question, the trial court in its findings expressly denied
credence to the substance of his testimony. Since, as aforestated, the credibility of witnesses is a matter wholly within
the province of the trial court, its discretion as here exercised will not be di<:turbedon appeal.
The evidence accredited by the trial court supports not
only its finding as to the fact of the offer of payment, but
also its sufficiency to prevent the running of interest on the
plaintiff's obligation. Thus, it appears that Mr. Kennedy as
representative of the defendant bank declined absolutely to
negotiate with the plaintiff in the matter and, without making any objection as to the form of the tender or questioning
the plaintiff's ability to perform his offer, he simply refused
to consider the proposition that the plaintiff had the right to
protect his interest in the property involved. Upon this basis
the trial court was warranted in concluding that any further
action by the plaintiff in this respect would have met with
like rebuff by the bank, and that a valid offer having once
been made and refused, the indebtedness ceased to bear interest as of that date. (Civ. Code, §§ 1496,1501, 1504; Lockhart v. J. H. McDougall Co., 190 Cal. 308 [212 P. 1].)
In accordance with the views above expressed, the judgment is modified by striking therefrom the figures $477.88,
and inserting in their place the figures $907.88, and as so
modified, the judgment is affirmed. Neither party to recover
costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J. pro
tem., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-The evidence in this case is
insufficient, in my opinion, to uphold the trial court's finding that defendant, with a deed of trust on real property
worth over $135,000 securing an indebtedness of $81,232.90,
entered into an agreement to reduce the indebtedness to
$60,000 and to accept an inarticulated mortgage in place of
its deed of trust.
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Since a mortgage secures an obligation it cannot be proved
that a conveyance is intended as a mortgage' if there is no
liability "independent of the conveyance and contract of
conveyance, which the grantee can enforce against the
grantor." (4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, [Symons'
fifth ed., 1941] § 1195, p. 579; Holmes v. Warren, 145
Cal. 457 [78 P. 954]; Ohapman v. Hicks, 41 Cal.App. 158
[182 P. 336]; see 17 Cal.Jur. 783.) The only debt in the
present case was that represented by Weiss's promissory
notes, and no relation was established between these notes
and the deed,option, and lease. The amount payable by
plaintiff to exercise the option was different from the amount
~ due on the notes, and the rent payable until the exercise of
the option was different from the interest prescribed by the
notes. The only evidence regarding .the notes in the disput~d
transaction shows that they were to be cancelled when plaintiff executed his deed to defendant. Both defendant's officers
and plaintiff testified to that effect. When plaintiff's deposition was taken before the trial, plaintiff was asked, "Now,
was anything said about the disposition to be made of Mr.
Weiss's notes during that conversation 7" and answered,
"Well, it was to be that when I gave them the deed to the
property, why, then they would cancel-well, that was automatically wiped out, the indebtedness that Mr. Weiss owed
them. " Plaintiff also testified, "As far as. the notes, I know
when they took a deed to the property and reconveyed it that'
these notes and the mortgage would be wiped' out, if the
deed was standing in the bank's name."
Plaintiff testified unequivocally on that occasion· that the
notes were to .be cancelled. His later testimony was inconsistent. At timeS he did not recall clearly what, if anything,
was said about the notes. When asked whether there was a
discussion as to the satisfaction or cancellation of the notes,
he replied, "Well, there might have been some little discussion but it didn't impress me very much at all that I can
remember. There might have been some." At times he adhered to his earlier testimony that the notes were to. be cancelled or satisfied. He was asked, "Wasn't the substance of
that discussion this, that when you gave them the deed to the
property they would cancel, that is, wipe out, the indebtedness that Mr. Weiss owed them Y" He replied, "That was
my impression. It would be, naturally. When they took it,

they would have to wipe that out in order to give me a new
mortgage. That was probably said, yes." He was also asked,
"They were going to take that deed in lieu of the indebted.
ness?" and answered, "I said that voluntarily, Mr. Plant,
that I assumed that is what they were doing it for and I still·
assume that is why they would take the deed." Yet, when
asked, "Isn't it a fact that you knew when they took the
deed from you they were going to cancel your indebtedness f"
plaintiff replied, "No, I didn't know that."
Plaintiff, in taking the position that the notes were to be
cancelled but that somehow the debt was not, appears to have
been influenced by the belief that some obligation against
him existed apart from the notes. When confronted' with his
earlier testimony, he did not repUdiate it but said, "Yes that
was my testimony, because I was assuming the indebtedness."
Plaintiff's brief suggests that the assumption agreement with
Weiss created "an independent contract obligation that was
to continue," and that "the Weiss indebtedness was to be
satisfied and his own continued."
.
The only liability plaintiff agreed to assume, however, was
the indebtedness represented by Weiss's promissory notes
and secured by the deed of trust. There was but one indebtedness, and while plaintiff became primarily liable therefor
and Weiss secondarily liable under the assumption agreement, its satisfaction would necessarily end both liabilities.
Plaintiff's testimony cannot be construed to suggest that this
indebtedness was to be satisfied as to Weiss, but continued as
to plaintiff, for in his answer to a suit brought by Weiss .he
declared that "he did fulfil and carry out the terms of -his
.
. agreement regarding the payment of said obligation against
said property and did procure the same to be released and
satisfied in fulL" What the trial court. found, moreover,. was
not that the deed was taken as security for some.independent
obligation arising from the assumption. agreement but· that
it was executed pursuant to an agreement that the "trust
deed indebtedness and interest" I.e;, the Weiss indebtedness,
should be reduced and the deed taken as security for' the re-:
duced indebtedness. The contention that the Weiss indebted.
ness was to be satisfied and the deed taken as security does
not support the finding but impeaches it.' The finding cannot be sustained unless it can be concluded that plaintiff
' .
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and defendant's officers understood that the Weiss notes were
to continue in effect.
The evidence establishes without contradiction that it was
intended that these notes be cancelled. Pursuant to that
understanding plaintiff executed the deed to defendant. Defendant marked the large note cancelled and wrote off the
smaller note at a loss, insi13ted upon receiving plaintiff's affidavit that the deed was executed in full satisfaction of the
indebtedness, and recorded the reconveyance reciting full
satisfaction of the indebtedness. Once these steps were taken
the bank was powerless to enforce payment of the notes. The
only reason in the majority opinion for holding that the debt
survived this operation is that the notes could not be cancelled without delivery to Weiss or to plaintiff. It is settled,
however, that the parties to a note can extinguish the obligation thereof by accepting something other than the performance promised. (Civ. Code, §§ 1521, 1522; Silvers v. Grossman, 183 Cal. 696 [192 P. 534] ; B. &; W. Engineering Co. v.
Beam, 23 Cal.App. 164 [137 P. 624] ; see Brannan's Negotiable
Instrument's Law, [Beutel's sixth ed., 1938] §119 (4), pp.
963, 964.) It has always been clear that the obligation of a
note can thus be terminated without delivery. (See cases
cited in Brannan, pp. 962, 964, supra.) Plaintiff's obligation
was terminated when defendant accepted the deed in satisfaction of the notes. The Colorado (Wittman v. Pickens, 33
Colo. 484 [81 P. 299]), the New Mexico (Hanna v. McCrory,
19 N.M. 183 [141 P. 996]), and the Montana (First State
Bank of Hilger v. Lang, 55 Mont. 146 [174 P. 597, 9 A.L.R.
1139] ), cases, which constitute the sole authority cited for a
contrary conclusion, actually establish only that delivery of
the notes is essential if the creditor proposes as a gift to free
the debtor.
Thus, even if this were an ordinary civil case where only
a preponderance of evidence is required, the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that the trust deed indebtedness, i.e., the Weiss indebtedness, should be reduced and the
deed taken as security for the reduced indebtedness, and is
likewise insufficient to support the contention that Beeler's
agreement to assume the Weiss indebtedness created an' independent contract obligation or that the .cancelled notes remained in effect. This is not an ordinary civil case, however,
fDr, as the majority opinion concedes, it was incumbent up01i
plaintiff to support his contention by evidence, "clear, satis-
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factory and convincing; explicit, unequivocal and indispu~
able." (Wehle v. Price, 202 Cal. 394, 397 [260 P. 878];
Goodfellow v. Goodfellow, 219 Cal. 548, 554 [27 P.2d 898].)
While it rests primarily with the trial court to determine
whether the evidence is clear and convincing, its finding is
not necessarily conclusive, for in cases governed by the rule
requiring such evidence "the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the finding should be considered by the appellate
court in the light of that rule." (Sheehan v. Sullivan, 126
Cal. 189, 193 [58 P. 543] ; see, also Moultrie v. Wright, 154
Cal. 520 [98 P. 257].) In such cases it is the duty of the appellate court in reviewing the evidence to determine, not
whether the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it
is more probable that the fact to be proved exists than that
it does not, as in the ordinary civil case where only a preponderance of the evidence is required, but whether the trier
of facts could reasonably conclude that it is highly probable
that the fact exists. When it holds that the trial court's finding must be governed by the same test with relation to substantial evidence as ordinarily applies in other civil cases,
the rule that the evidence must be clear and convincing becomes meaningless. There is a contradiction in thus destroying the vitality of the rule while affirming its soundness. If,
as in my opinion, the rule is sound, this court has erred in
its pronouncements (see 25 Cal. Jur. 248; 2 Cal.Jur. 921)
declining to accept responsibility for its enforcement. (See
my dissenting opinion in Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.2d
808, 817 [141 P.2d 732].)
The doctrine that a deed may be shown to be a mortgage
was originally an equitable one. It is also to be recalled that
in equity cases the appellate court would review the facts
de novo. Although the question whether the evidence establishes that a deed was intended as a mortgage is now decided
by the jury in this state (Locke v. Moulton, 108 Cal. 49 [41
P. 28], see contra, Reilly v. Cullen, 159 Mo. 322 [60 S.W.
126]) the jury's determination must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence. It is doubtful whether the rule
that it is a question for the jury whether a deed was intended
to be a mortgage would have been adopted without the protection afforded by the rule requiring the evidence to be clear
and convincing. Thus, in considering a similar problem with
240.24-2
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to"the-reformation of contracts, Judge Cardozo, for
the New York Court of Appeals, declared: "Juries may
find it difficult to apply the presumption that preliminary
treaties are merged in the written contract if they are permitted to consider such treaties as evidence of mistake.
Against these and like dangers, there are two methods of relief. One is suggested by the provision of the statute that
'the court in its discretion may order one or more issues to
be separately tried. . .' The other is found in a strict enforcement of the rule that reformat.ion must be refused unless the case in support of it is 'of the clearest and most
satisfactory character.' ... Judgments for reformation have
been reversed even in this court for failure to obey it."
(Susquehanna S.s. Co. v. A. O. Andersen &- Co., 239 N.Y.
285,296 [146 N.E. 381].)
So grave is the danger that deeds will be erroneously
found to be mortgages that some states have refused to apply
the doctrine that a deed may be shown to be a mortgage except upon proof of fraud or mistake (see Jackson v. Maxwell, 113 Me. 366, 368 [94 A. 116]), while others have held
that the doctrine will not be applied unless the grantor's
testimony is corroborated by indepeYJ.dent testimony. (Stitt
v. Rat Portage Lttmber Co., 96 Minn. 27, 32 [104 N.W. 561].)
The solution adopted in this state of requiring clear and
convincing evidence requires not simply that the appellate
courts go through the form of recognizing thc rule, but that,
like the appellate courts of many other states, they accept
responsibility for its enforcement. (Susquehanna S.S. Co. v.
A. O. Andersen &- Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 296 [146 N.E. 381] ;
Allison Bros. Co. v. Allison, 144 N.Y. 21, 33 [38 N.E. 956] ;
Nevius v. Dunlap, 33 N.Y. 676, 680; Baird v. Baird, 48 Colo.
506, 517 [111 P. 79]; Rasch v. Rasch, 278 Ill. 261, 271 [115
N.E. 871] ; Jackson v. Maxwell, 113 Me. 366, 368 [94 A. 116] ;
Frohlich v. Aikman, 194 Mich. 569, 573 [161 N.W. 867] j
Baum v. Ward, 131 Ark. 593 [199 S.W. 529] ; Nicolls v. McDonald, 101 Pa.St. 514; Pancake v. Cattffman, 114 Pa.St. 113
[7 A. 67] ; Jeffcoat v. Wingard, 110 S.C. 482 [96 S.E. 9081 ;
Page v. Page, 132 Va. 63 [110 S.E. 370] ; Salas v. Olmos, 47
N.M.409 [143 P.2d 871, 874].) The United States Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed its responsibility for enforcement
of the rule in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118,
124 [63 S.Ot. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796}, where it declared: "For
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though we assume, without deciding, that in the absence of
fraud a certificate of naturalization can be set aside under
§ 15 as 'illegally procured' because of the finding as to attachment [to the principles of the Constitution] would later
seem to be erroneous, we are of the opinion that this judgment should be reversed. If a finding of attachment can be
so reconsidered in a denaturalization suit, our decisions make
it plain that the Government needs more than a bare preponderance of the evidence to prevail. The remedy afforded
the Government by the denaturalization statute has been
said to be a narrower one than that of direct appeal from
the granting of a petition. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S.
568, 579 [46 S.Ot. 425, 70 L.Ed. 738] ; cf. United States v.
Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 325 [38 S.Ot. 118,62 L.Ed. 321]. Johannessen v. United States states that a certificate of citizenship
is 'an instrument granting political privileges and open like
other public grants to be revoked if and when it shall be
found to have been unlawfully or fraudulently procured. It
is in this respect closely analogous to a public grant of land
, . . ' 225 U.S. 227, 238 [32 S.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066]. See
also Tutun v. United States, supra. To set aside such a grant
the evidence must be 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing''it cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence
which leaves the issue in doubt.' Maxwell Land-Grant Case,
121 U.S. 325, 381 [7 S.Ct. 1015,30 L.Ed. 949] ; United States
v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 300 [8 S.Ct. 850, 31
L.Ed. 747]; cf. United States v. Rovin, 12 F.2d 942, 944.
See Wig'more, Evidence, (3d od.) § 2498. This is so because
rights once conferred should not be lightly revoked. And
more especially is this true when the rights are precious and
when they are conferred by solemn adjudication, as is the
situation when citizenship is granted. The Government's evidence in this case does not measure up to this exacting
standard. ' ,
One searches the record in vain for clear and convincing
evidence that the deed in this case was intended to 'be 'a
mortgage. The majority opinion relies largely on plaintiff.'s
testimony. That testimony was impeached, however, beca'use
of the interest of the plaintiff, and because it was inconsistent
with his sworn affidavit. The story told was, moreover, an
incredible one; that purely for hookkeeping purposE'S the
bank elltered ill to all agreemellt to accept an inarticulated
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mortgage in the sum of $60,000 in lieu of a deed of trust
on real property worth over $135,000 securing an indebtedness of $81,232.90.
Plaintiff's contention rests upon inferences that he seeks
to elicit from evidence relative to the circumstances under
which the deed was delivered and to the subsequent conduct
of the parties. This evidence does not warrant plaintiff's
inferences. It is described in the majority opinion as "entirely consistent with the view that defendant bank, while
in fact agreeing on a loan secured by a mortgage, was desirous, for reasons of certain interdepartmental requirements
connected with its routine bookkeeping procedure, of giving
the transaction a different appearance by recording it as an
absolute transfer of title." It is not enough for the evidence
merely to be consistent with plaintiff's contention, however,
for it is wholly consistent with the agreement set forth in the
writings. The burden was on plaintiff to prove that it was
highly probable that the deed was not what it purported to
be. He did not sustain this burden by evidence that at best
is simply consistent with the deed's being something else,
but which is just as consistent with its being what it purports to be. (Goodfellow v. Goodfellow, supra; Wehle v.
Price, supra; Woods v. Jensen, supra.)
Plaintiff infers from the fact that the $3,000 rental specified in the lease was equivalent to 5 per cent of the option
.price of $60,000, that the rental was actually interest, and
the option price actually an indebtedness. Such a rental is
bound to be a percentage of the option price and is apt to
fall within the normal range of interest returns on investments equivalent to that price. It would be as arbitrary,
however, to transmute a rental into an interest charge because it produced the same return as to transmute a dividend
from stock into interest from a bond. There is nothing in the
mathematical relation between the two figures that gives any
clue to what they represent; the substance of the relationship is not found in the sums. It is to the terms of a transaction that one must look, and not to the sums involved, since
transactions may differ widely in nature, however alike may
be the sums they involve.
Plaintiff contends that Mr. Kennedy, the bank's representative, agreed to have an appraisal made of a tract of
land that plaintiff owned in Paradise, California, to guide
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the bank in taking it in either "to reduce the debt" or "as
additional security," and infers that if the security was "additional" the deed in question was a mortgage. By plaintiff's
own testimony, however, the conversations regarding the
Paradise property were concerned with the possibility of defendant's taking it as part of the option price. In the negotiations of September 22nd he asked if defendant would take
the Paradise property to reduce the indebtedness. Kennedy
replied that the bank could not do so, but that if plaintitt
gave the bank the deed and took back a lease and option, the
latter would examine the property to determine whether it
would be acceptable as part payment of the option price or
as additional security for a part thereof. This. suggestion
obviously contemplated the possibility that the parties Drlght
later enter into an arrangement enabling plai.ntiff to exercise
his option by paying only part of the price in cash.. Follow~
iug Elberg's visit to the property Kennedy told the plaintiff
that the bank could not take it outright, but might take it
as additional security. It cannot reasonably be inferred even
from plaintiff's own testimony that defendant regarded the
indebtedness as subsisting and contemplated the Paradise
property as additional security for that indebtedness rather
than for the option price.
Plaintiff relies upon the testimony of his banker, Mr.
Brown, for support for his contention. Brown merely testi:fied, however, that he was present during the :first part of
the conversation of September 22nd, but left before its con-.
elusion; that respondent asked for another extension of time;
that Kennedy replied that back-interest would have to be
paid up "before any discussion of that sort"; that there was
some discussion as to whether the deed of trust covered all
of the property to which plaintiff had title, and that "just
as I left they had sent for the certificate or for the deed of
trust. ' , There is nothing in this testimony to suggest that
defendant agreed to reduce the indebtedness and accept the
deed as security for the lower amount.
The exception in the title policy of "any rights of C. W.
Beeler who is in possession" is invoked to uphold the contention that the deed was simply a mortgage. It was defendant's lease and option, however, that necessitated this
exception. Before the transaction was closed, defendant was
advised by Mr. McGlyn, an officer of the Tehama County
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Title Company,' that- plaintiff's affidavit put an end to his
iiiterest in the property. Plaintiff replied that he had an
option. McGlyn later advised the Title Insurance and Guarantee Company by telephone that defendant had a lease and
option and would remain in possession of the property, and
that company thereupon obtained defendant's confirmation
of these facts and its consent to the exception in the title
policy.
No support for plaintiff's contention can be found in the
discussion regarding the sixty-dollar internal revenue stamp.
The stamp was already on the deed and the title company
had been instructed to bill defendant for its cost so there is
no reason why McGlyn should have asked plaintiff whether
he refused to put the stamp on. In any event whatever views
plaintiff may have expressed to McGlyn about the deed's
being merely a means of refinancing, there is no claim that
he communicated his views to defendant. (See Brant v. Oalifornia Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 128 [48 P.2d 13].)
Plaintiff relies heavily upon the finding of the trial court
that when the deed in question was executed, the property
had a market value of more than $135,000, and a rental value
of more than $7,500, figures that substantially exceeded the
option price and the rental fixed in the lease. Such an excess
in conjunction with other circumstances is often indicative
of a: security transaction, for the greater the valuation in relation to the indebtedness, the more unlikely the owner is to
sell the property to cancel the indebtedness. In this case,
however, the parties themselves, whose valuations alone are
pertinent (Tetenman v. Epstein, 66 Cal.App. 745 [226 P.
966]), did not attach so high a value to the property. Even
if they had, it is inconceivable that the bank would voluntarily have reduced an indebtedness so amply secured, and
l'elinquished, to its own disadvantage, a deed of trust for
~uch a mortgage. (See Robinson v. Barnard, 5 Cal.App.2d
:196,400 [42 P.2d 711].)
There is nothing in the evidence of conduct subsequent
\0 the transaction to establish that the deed was taken as
liecurity rather than in satisfaction of the indebtedness, or
that plaintiff had anything more than a lease and an option.
Plaintiff's repair of the fences and removal of the walnut
trees following the flood of the Sacramento River in 1937 do
not signify that the bank regarded him as the owner of the
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property. He was bound by the terms of his lease to repair
the fences, and he removed the walnut trees only after obtaining defendant's consent. Even if the improvements were
more extensive than the lease required they do not signify
ownership, for they would redound to the advantage of the
plaintiff if he exercised the option. The evidence of the leases
by the plaintiff likewise fails to establish him as the owner
of the property, for his lease from the bank permitted him
to make subleases, and it was a matter of indifference to the
bank whether the instruments executed by the plaintiff and
his lessees took the form of leases rather than subleases.
Even assuming that a debt still existed, and that the deed
was intended to secure it, there is no evidence that the debt
was $60,000 and not $81,232.90, the amount due when 'the
deed was executed. It is contended that it was agreed that
the debt should thus be reduced at the conference between
plaintiff and the bank officials. Plaintiff, however, testified
without contradiction that it was then agreed, that the notes
be cancelled. Following the conference, the deed, the lease
containing the option, and the affidavit were executed as
formal memorials of the agreement then made. While parol
evidence is admissible to show that a deed is a mortgage, it
is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract so
as to transform it from a complete to a partial cancellation.
(Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1856; see 10 Cal.Jur. 916, 924.) The
majority opinion holds that the notes were not discharged,
because they were not delivered to Weiss or to plaintiff. Yet
the larger note was cancelled, the smaller one was written
off as a loss, and satisfaction of both was recorded pursuant
to the understanding of plaintiff and defendant. Despite
these facts it is held that without delivery of any note, the
debt is reduced to $60,000, the amount of the larger note. It
is pertinent to inquire how the smaller note is then discharged
without delivery.
Moreover, the supposed agreement to release plaintiff from
a liability of over $21,000 was clearly without consideration
and is unenforceable. (Scheeline v. Moshier, 172 Cal. 565
[158 P. 222]; see 6 Cal.Jur. 179.) If the deed was given
merely as security it represented less than defendant already
had. The deed of trust contained the usual power of sale and
other provisions for defendant's protection and was not subject to the 1933 amendments restricting the right to judg-
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ment for a deficiency. (Cal. Civ. Code, § 2924%; Cal. Code
Civ. Proc., § 580(a).) Regarded as security, the deed was
less advantageous to defendant, less burdensome to plaintiff. It conferred no power of sale and would have to be foreclosed by court proceedings, thereby leaving plaintiff with a
right to redeem. It contained no provisions for defendant's
protection and was subject to the 1933 amendments. As security, therefore, the deed, far from being of advantage to
the defendant, was of advantage to plaintiff. Since the alleged agreement was oral, and it appeared upon the face of
the complaint that there was no consideration, a special plei!by defendant of lack of consideration was unnecessary.
(Acheson v. Western Union Tel. 00.,96 Cal. 641 [31 P. 583];
see 2 Cal.Jur. 257.)

[Sac. No. 5506.
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STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Respondent, v. CHARLES G. JOHNSON,
as Treasurer, etc., Appellant.
[1] Sales-Passage of Title-Delivery to Carrier-F. O. B. Ship-

ments.-Whether or not the seller's delivery of personal property to a carrier constitutes delivery to the buyer depends on
the intention of the parties as ascertained from the contract of
sale and other circumstances of the case. Ordinarily, unless a
contrary intent appears, where tile seller contracts to deliver
goods at a given destination and he delivers them to a carrier
consigned to the buyer with freight charges paid by the seller
(f.o.b. point of destination), the delivery to the carrier does
not constitute delivery to the buyer and title does not pass until
the goods have arrived at their destination.
[2] Id.-Passage of Title-Delivery to Carrier-Where Carrier is
Buyer.-The mere fact that the railroad which received shipments of fuel oil in California to be transported outside the
state was also the buyer of the oil did not show that there was
[1] F.o.b. provision in sale contract as affecting time or place of
passage of title, notes, 101 A.L.R. 292. See, also, 22 Cal.Jur. 949,
953; 46 Am.Jur. 349-350, 609.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4,5] Sales, §97(7); [3] Carriers,
§ 18; [6] Carriers, § 24; [7] CommercII, § 8.

[6]

[7]
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necessarily an actual delivery in the state to the railroad as
buyer instead of a delivery to it in its capacity as a common
carrier.
Carriers-Property-Duty to Carry.-A railroad as a common
carrier is required to accept all goods tendered to it for
carriage that it is able to carry, and it cannot legally refuse to
carry goods as property of the shipper if the goods are tendered
to it for this purpose.
Sales - Passage of Title - Delivery to Carrier - Intent of
Parties.-Where a contract of sale of fuel oil to a railroad required the seller to fill the railroad's requisitions by deliveries
at the places therein specified, and the oil was delivered to the
railroad, and was shipped to out-of-state destinations under
standard bills of lading with the buyer named as consignee and
with freight charges prepaid by the seller (f.o.b. such destinations), it was intended that the railroad in its capacity as common carrier should receive the oil at the point of shipment as
property of the seller, and that delivery to the railroad as
buyer should not take place until the oil arrived at its destination outside the state.
Id.-Passage of Title-Delivery to Carrier-F.O.B. Shipments.
-The terms of an amended contract of sale of fuel oil to a railroad and the form of shipping documents naming the buyer as
consignee were not to be disregarded on the ground that the
purpose of making the delivery f.o.b. destination outside the
state instead of, as in the original contract, f.o.b. the tank cars
was to avoid the payment of sales taxes to the state, where,
although the freight charges prepaid by the seller under the
amended contract were added to the sales price, the seller was
deprived of the use of the money paid for freight until the oil
was paid for by the buyer, and where, under that contract, risk
of loss during transportation was on the seller, as owner, rather
than the buyer.
Carriers-Property-Liability for Loss or Injury.-Civ. Code,
§§ 2194, 2195, do not make the carrier an insurer against all
losses of property entrusted to it; and risk of loss from such
causes as acts of a public enemy, acts "of the law," and any
"irresistible superhuman cause," remains with the owner of
the property.
Commerce-Taxation-Intrastate Transactions.-Where fuel
oil was sold to a railroad under a contract requiring the seller
to fill the railroad's requisitions by deliveries at designated
points outside the state, and where the oil loaded into tank
cars of the railroad within the state was transported to destina-

[7] See 24 Cal.Jur. 135 j 26 R.C.L. 86, 120.

